|
 |
|||||||||||||||||||
|
|||||||||||||||||||
|
|||||||||||||||||||
 |
 |
|
|
Center for Cognitive Studies, Tufts University, Medford, Massachusetts 02155, USA
Address for correspondence: Daniel C. Dennett, Center for Cognitive Studies, Tufts University, Medford, MA 02155-3952. Voice: 617-627-3297; fax: 617-627-3952. ddennett{at}tufts.edu Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. 1001: 39-50 (2003).
The powerful illusion of a unified, Cartesian self responsible for intentional action is contrasted with the biologically sounder model of competitive processes that yield an only partially coherent agency, and the existence of the illusion of self is explained as an evolved feature of communicating agents, capable of responding to requests and queries about their own decisions and actions.
Key Words: self • consciousness • agency • free will • timing of voluntary actions This article has been cited by other articles:
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
 |
 |
